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‘Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics in 
multispecies homes’  
Abstract 
Drawing on Roberto Esposito’s conceptualisation of “affirmative biopolitics” this article 
examines the relationship between bedbugs and humans in the Glasgow neighbourhood 
of Govanhill. Through an analysis of ethnographic field notes and interviews with people 
who live in the area, I trace their experiences from first encounters. The trajectory of this 
experience shows a shift from a desire to immunise their homes through total annihilation 
of the creatures to the more pragmatic position of learning how to live with them through 
an orientation toward ‘shared vulnerability’.  This case study raises interesting questions 
for biopolitical theory: how can we conceive of affirmative biopolitics when the 
limitations of species being are evident, and is it possible to conceive of an multi or even 
interspecies munus? 
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Confronted with the presence of bedbugs, the governmental and public view in Govanhill 
is mobilised through the logic of negative biopolitics/thanatopolitics: that bedbug life 
(zoe) should be sacrificed to protect human life (bios). However the operations of killing 
bedbugs have a set of wider effects. The wide spread use of pesticides have deleterious 
environmental and local impacts which cause harm to human life. Drawing on Esposito’s 
biopolitcal theory, this could be considered auto-immunity; as attempts to protect life 
generate harm thus rendering the protective or immunising act suicidal. The ways in 
which participants in this study shifted their position evidences a disruption in this 
process which opened new possibilities for living with creatures previously thought 
impossible. This is explored through Esposito’s affirmative bio-politics or politics of life, 
where the struggle for life creates new possibilities.  Green and Ginn (2014) theorization 
of ‘shared vulnerability’ affords deeper understanding of this shift. This trajectory of 
thought extends the anthropocentric concerns of biopolitical theory in a shift toward a 
more than human affirmative biopolitics in the frame of a multispecies munus.   
The first part of this paper provides an overview of Esposito’s affirmative 
biopolitics, paying attention to the need to move away from an anthropocentric view of 
the munus. This is followed by a brief overview of methods which leads to an abductive 
analysis of the experience of three research participants who live with bedbugs.  The 
application of Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics within the context of everyday life makes 
the ethical problems of multispecies living accessible for analysis. This ethical 
perspective of the multispecies munus can disrupt the suicidal tendency of negative 
biopolitics.   
 
Affirmative Biopolitics  
Esposito’s biopolitical trilogy (2008, 2009, 2011) follows an argument that commences 
with a critique of Hobbes in Communitas and concludes with a proposition of 
affirmative biopolitics based in Deleuze’s Spinozism in Bíos. This is a genealogy of 
biopolitics organized around the concept of communitas as the relational condition of life 
that is not dependent on identity. His etymology of community separates the ‘munus’ 
which is the shared obligation, gift or duty with ‘cum’ or with. The munus ‘links all of us 
in a reciprocal non-identity.’ (Esposito, 2009). The com-munus is a ‘debt that binds us’. 
This is a community without borders, limits or definition. This view moves away from 
the unitary individual or collective subject toward contingent relations which are always 
in negotiation. Esposito states that the munus is always experienced as a loss and, thus, it 
is this nothing that requires ‘excavation’.  This is a rejection of the unitary subject 
produced by modern liberal thought:  
Community is nothing other than the border, or transition, between this 
immense devastation of sense and the necessity that each singularity, each 
event, each fragment of existence must be in itself meaningful. It refers 
back to the character, both singular and plural, of an existence freed from 
any presupposed, or imposed, or postponed sense; of a world reduced to 
itself, able to be simply what it is: a planetary world, without direction or 
cardinal points. A nothing-else-than-world. And it is this nothing in 
common which is the world that associates us in the condition of 
exposition to the hardest absence of sense and, at the same time, to the 
opening of a sense yet to be thought. (Esposito, 2009:35) 
Esposito also describes the munus as a wound, which he frames not as pathology 
but as an opening to new possibilities. His definition simultaneously holds the threat and 
injury of loss with the necessary exposure which affords new relations. As such he warns 
against a ‘reductive and simplified image of community’ (Esposito, 2013b: 26). He 
describes the desire to fix identity as a form of immunisation against this loss. He argues 
‘that immunization was born so as to protect life from its communitarian drift into chaos’ 
(Esposito, 2013b:114). Greg Bird argues that Esposito’s formulation challenges the 
common logic employed in identity politics, where emancipation is premised upon the 
idea that one can become an owner of their identity. This is a product of one of the 
governing mechanisms of modern liberalism, which he calls the ‘dispositif of the proper’ 
(Bird, 2016). In this ‘dispositif’, emancipation can only occur when members overcome 
their alienation by appropriating their identity and that of community itself. This he 
suggests produces a double-negative which reduces difference to sameness, and results in 
a further set of inclusions and exclusions. This is evident in Govanhill where 
longstanding residents express the desire to protect their environment from change 
generated by the introduction of difference in the form of migrants.   
Esposito describes this desire for protection as a by-product of the paradigm of 
immunity, which seeks protection from contamination. However he argues that the cross 
contamination of wounds is crucial in the movement of life.  For Esposito community is 
not a coalition of subjects but the visceral exposure of contingent relations. Moreover it is 
the desire to fix the subject and protect it from this contamination which shuts down 
community. To this end the preservation of identity is a totalitarianism which seeks to 
close the wound of the munus. He uses the example of the Nazi project as one which 
sought to protect a perceived pure life from contaminants which might have destroyed it 
and in doing so negated one form of life in favour of another. He states ‘Nazim 
constituted the catastrophic apex of this reversal of biopolitics into its opposite, 
thanatopolitics’ (Esposito, 2013b: 115). This frequently used example evinces how the 
drive to intervene to preserve life becomes a thanatopolitics of who or what is allowed to 
live. Esposito goes on to offer a model of affirmative biopolitics that challenges the 
negative, thanatopolitical ends of Agamben’s account. He uses the example of mother 
and fetus as an ‘opening to difference’ of one body to another which ‘contradicts the 
immunitary logic of self preservation’ (2008:108). He later (2015) develops these ideas 
drawing on Simondon’si (1992) theory of individuation which proposes an immanent 
vitalism, focused on the process of becoming not the being of subject. Through 
Simondon’s thought Esposito articulates the body as a ‘floating bridge’ (2015:81) which 
connects with objects which also have ‘subjective components’. In doing so he embraces 
the potential of metastability.  Where metastability can be characterized as the infinite 
potentiality that can never be exhausted, which is ‘embedded––like code––in all 
manifestations in actuality that are selectively unfolded pending in what relational 
assemblage any emergent thing stands’ (Faucher, 2013:127). Esposito’s munus is a 
metastable entity, thus it is not reducible to a subject – it is always in flux, and loss and 
possibility are immanent to each other.  
Thinking with the immanent vitalism of Simondon (1992) and Deleuze and 
Guattari (1983, 1987), Esposito avoids the nihilism of Agamben’s thanatopolitics. He 
reads immunity as an interval between the thing and what it is not. He recognizes the 
polarity of the immunitary paradigm, between protection and negation, where the risk of 
destruction is constitutive in movement. His thinking presents a radical challenge to 
modernist thought that builds from the stable unit of the subject. It challenges what it 
means to be human and more than this how life can be defined. This line of thinking 
radically unsettles conceptual categories which stabilize the differences between species, 
matter and life.  
Unlike others who draw on similar post foundational thinking (Bennett, 2010; 
Haraway, 2010), Esposito’s reliance on etymology holds him close to 
anthropocentricism. A reliance on phenomenological unity can be discerned in Bird’s 
(2016) discussion of the munus which focuses on the constitution of human life as ‘Homo 
approprians.’ Bird asserts that in order to arrive at a shared world, ‘Homo approprians’ 
must be ‘disrupted, incapacitated’ (202). This may challenge the dominance of 
‘approprians,’ but it does not go far enough. What about the ‘homo?’ A movement 
toward an interspecies munus which recognizes material, virtual and more than human 
relations requires the disruption of the human. To push the implicit post humanism of 
Esposito’s munus, both must be disrupted. The insights from his biopolitical trilogy, 
extended into his later works, lead to the conclusion that doing justice to living involves 
‘taking into consideration other living species, such as animals, plants, and non-organic 
materials, even technics itself’ (Neyrat, 2005: 134). While Esposito does outline the 
impersonal work of the body in both Bíos (2008) and Persons and Things (2015) he tends 
not to move far from an implicit understanding of the ‘body’ as a human body. In his 
introduction to Persons and Things he signals that the ‘human body does not coincide 
with the person or the thing, it opens up a perspective that is external to the fracture that 
one projects on the other’ (2015: 14).  Furthermore, drawing on Sloterdijlk, Esposito 
claims we ‘need to break through the barrier that has divided the world into opposing 
species’ (2015, 83). Esposito concludes his discussion with a sense of optimism around 
this ‘radical novelty’ which resists and transgresses normative binaries and calls for a 
‘renewal of the vocabularies of politics, law and philosophy’ (2015: 88). Although he 
brings an idea of the more than human body into the fray of political science, he stops 
short of developing a vocabulary or model which might be useful in the field. Nor does 
he address the ethical questions that emerge when the human subject is radically 
decentred.  
The limitations of theorizing such an extreme relativism are widely noted, 
particularly by scholars of the left. Hornborg proposes that blurring the distinction 
between subject and object, and ascribing agency to non-sentient entities makes it 
impossible to challenge ‘global power relations’ (2017:95). This criticism exposes the 
most persistent limitations of post humanism. However, as Sklair (2017) notes the 
problem with such views is that they argue for more of the same; models of resistance 
and reform of capitalism and the state which are now ‘threadbare’. Thinking with 
Esposito offers another way to make sense, a different form of resistance. The meta-
stability of Esposito’s munus are the grounds of both subject and not-subject which can 
help make sense of the dynamics of complex unfolding relations which involve, humans, 
and more than human, material and animals. In looking at a politics of life, Esposito 
draws attention to the actions which influence relations, possibility and experience which 
are not a result of sentient agency but occur and affect nevertheless. Thinking with 
Esposito does not neutralize power relations, but calls them out in all their multiple forms 
for scrutiny.  
Operationalising the abstraction of an interspecies ‘munus’ in a live context is 
challenging as there is an inevitable contradiction in any attempt to isolate a flow in order 
to fix meaning, I have therefore adopted a genealogical approach. Scholars focused on 
flow from Nietzsche (2005) through Foucault (1972), including Esposito, have adopted a 
genealogical approach. Genealogy follows data seams and affords abductive analysis 
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2012) which does not focus on linear causes and effects but on 
entangled relations. The site of this study is an area in which I have undertaken a number 
of social research projects (Author, 2010, 2015). Although these projects were not 
without impact the focus on human relations side-lined the important material, 
environmental, more than human factors. Therefore the research reported in this article 
involved gathering ethnographic and historical data of human and more than human 
participants. Participant observation meant ‘being with’ (Ingold, 2014) the streets. Using 
sensory ethnography (Pink, 2009) I followed emergent seams of interest, a significant one 
of which was the issue of bedbugs. People with whom I made contact on the street 
invited me into their homes to discuss their experience, this interest snowballed as they 
told me of other people who also lived with these creatures.  
This article draws on the experience of three households. Participants are 
anonymised as: MA, a recent European migrant; AC, a Glaswegian who recently moved 
to the area; and DB, a longstanding resident. Their stories anchor the variety of factors 
through which Govanhill has become a place where bedbugs have taken residence. This 
analysis of human/bedbug relations is developed through insights from Esposito’s 
affirmative biopolitics and concept of the wound alongside insights from posthuman 
scholarship. The following discussion explores life with bedbugs as an exposure to the 
wound, the immunitary attempt to close the wound, and the ethics of encounter as ‘shared 
vulnerability’. This affords a means of living within the wound which resists 
thanatapolitical closure. 
The politics of life in multispecies homes 
The development of life science through the 19th and 20th Centuries attended not just to 
the extension of human life through medicine but to increased human comfort through 
practices of sanitation involving the use of chemicals. This technology afforded a new 
level of control by humans over other forms of life. As a result of this dirt has become 
associated with bare life (zoe) and cleanliness with human politicised life (bios). Bedbugs 
have by most accounts always lived alongside humans as a source of discomfort. 
However from the 1950’s humans with access to newly developed chemicals could 
immunise themselves against their bites through bug extermination. This decision over 
which life is allowed to live and who can make such a decision is fundamental to 
negative biopolitics/thanatopolitics. As a result of this particular thanatapolitical 
endeavour bedbugs, in the ‘west’, have become a thing of the past, associated with 
Victorian squalor and poverty.  
The thanatopolitical discourse on bedbugs became evident in my discussions with 
the people I met in Govanhill and in the media accounts of the so-called “bedbug 
infestation” in this neighbourhood. That people are forced to live with bedbugs was 
generally treated as a negative impact of structural inequality. Some people that I 
interviewed made explicit connections between poverty and bedbugs. Often this negative 
discourse was premised in explicitly racialized terms when referencing Roma incomers. 
Others proposed the inverse, that the failure by policy makers to acknowledge the 
impacts of the impoverished lifestyles of the incoming Roma people oppresses them. 
Both perspectives concur with the view that to question bedbug extermination on moral 
or rational grounds is unthinkable. As a result the local authority established a dedicated 
pest control team to deal with these and other ‘pests’ through chemical extermination 
practices. This environmental team based in Govanhill provides a free service which 
involves spraying flats which report the presence of bedbugs with insecticides, setting 
bait boxes and administering chemicals where there are reports of rodents.  
I was first introduced to “bedbug affects” through ‘unplanned’ conversations that 
I had on the streets in Govanhill. I recognised that this was a highly significant aspect of 
life in the area and therefore explored these initial conversations further through the more 
detailed discussions in the homes of individuals and families. These households were 
willing to not only talk with me and allow me to see their homes, but also allowed me 
meet the bugs themselves. What was immediately striking in all accounts was that the 
second order affects generated by sharing residence with bedbugs were more potent than 
the first order affects of their presence. First order affects are those generated by first 
contact, therefore not filtered by any interpretation based in either additional knowledge 
or cultural inflection. These are observations of presence before emotional or rational 
judgment. Second Order affects are a stage removed; a response to the first order that is 
drawn from cultural attitudes, and association, or from reason. Second order affects, 
precipitate tangible experience, they extend from the first order but entangle other factors 
depending on situation. The first affect of human/bedbug contact described were bites 
which appear on some as red dots, on others as more noticeable itchy spots.   All 
participants discussed in this article first assumed this rash was an allergy or when 
observed in children a childhood ailment. As such this interpretation did not cause undue 
distress but was simply a problem to be addressed. The knowledge that what they were 
seeing and or experiencing were the bites of bedbugs transformed a nuisance bite into a 
more horrific experience.  
While participants said that their internet research had led them to images of people with 
extensive rashes they reported the bites themselves more as a nuisance. From the bedbug 
perspective, a degree of care was shown. Their saliva has anesthetic and antiseptic 
qualities which minimize the risk of pain or harm to the host (Benoit et al, 2016). As a 
result, participants said that the bites had not disturbed their sleep or caused infection. 
Knowledge that the bugs were present in the home alerted participants to other 
environmental affects of bedbugs, such as traces of blood on sheets and a black mould 
like substance on the crevices of their bedframes and boards. These material traces, 
which had until this point gone unnoticed, with knowledge of their source appeared to 
cause more distress than the rash. MA literally shrieked as she recalled the realization 
that these creatures were living in her house:   
‘I was sitting in my gown and I thought something is eating and I just 
grabbed and there was a bedbug and there is just this, really don’t believe 
that there is bedbug in your house. There’s just a sense of HORROR you 
really feel.  NOOOOOOOOO IT CANT BE – NOT IN MY FLAT’. (MA) 
DB was conscious that there were some insects in her bedroom but the discovery that 
these were bedbugs caused her such alarm she fled her house: 
‘I cannot remember how or why but I googled it and found that it was 
bedbugs. Then I looked at our headboard and it was infested. I absolutely 
freaked out. I just grabbed the kids and ran out of the house.’ (DB) 
The substance of this horror became clearer when participants described these tiny 
creatures as an invasion of their most intimate space. MA notes revulsion at their ‘fed’ 
bodies with the awareness that they are shining with the blood of herself and her children. 
‘You get the sense of horror – you know I know they are sitting behind the 
chest of drawers and I have to move it away and kill them all. I am like 
just thinking they will be sitting in some corner all fed with their shiny 
bodies its too much too take’ (MA). 
Her expression of abjection revolves around the breaching of the boundaries of not just 
her physical space but also her body. She is repulsed by this connection. This is the 
abjection expressed by Kristeva (1973) who builds on Douglas’ (1966) social 
construction of dirt as a boundary breach. Body fluids, faeces, urine, blood and vomit are 
evidence of the breakdown of the integrity of the body testing the divide between it and 
all else. Horror is the breakdown of the boundary between the self and other. ‘These body 
fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty on the 
part of death’ (Kristeva, 1973: 3). Kristeva argues that filth becomes politicized as it is 
not a lack of cleanliness that causes abjection but what does not respect borders, rules, 
and identities (Wolkowitz, 2007:18). The presence of the bugs destabilises the security of 
the perceived lines which distinguish human from bug, a threat which for many had a 
much more profound effect than the material exchange of human blood and bedbug 
saliva. There is certainly an anxiety about dirt and its associated shame, but this sense of 
horror goes beyond dirt, it is a fear of a perceived threat to the integrity of the body. This 
is the horror of exposure to Esposito’s wound as a site of contamination. MA reflected 
that this fear was not rationale: 
‘I don’t know – it’s something apparently many people have it this fear of 
bugs or snakes or something it’s just because they are so deeply ingrained 
in our psyche that they are dirty’ (MA).  
The expression of the associated shame was channeled through gender, class and 
ethnicity, as MA expressed succinctly: 
‘Maybe it’s that I should be more of a housewife, I’m not clean enough, 
I’m not working hard enough to get my house into shape. For me it’s just I 
always see myself being criticized by this bedbug, it’s all about you know 
these posh women see this Eastern European with bedbugs in her house 
and it’s just that control over your life’ (MA).   
Coming into contact with the bugs was therefore not just a threat to bodily 
integrity but to identity and agency. Aspects of identity already pressured by societal 
norms of class, race and gender were exposed by the presence of the bugs reinforcing the 
deleterious implications. This concern of not being ‘in control’ speaks further to the 
breaching of boundaries. Implicit in this contributor’s comment is an idea that more 
affluent long-term residents have more control and are more able to guard their 
boundaries.  It is therefore no surprise that this shame precipitated a reluctance to talk 
about the bugs publicly. DB got beyond this silent shame and exposed the reality that 
bedbugs make no distinction on the lines of class and ethnicity: 
After the meeting several people came to me and said they had been 
struggling with them and were glad I had raised it. It’s the fear of other 
people knowing and thinking that you are dirty. One of the women was on 
the board of a charity so they are quite respectable so you would think 
they would be on the phone and getting it dealt with but they had kept it 
under wraps because of the shame (DB). 
As a result of this shame DB sought to internalize the immunization mechanisms to 
shelter herself and her family and restrict their social contact with others: 
It was a pretty horrendous time, there was a lot of crying you know, what 
has my life come to? How is this happening to us? It was a horrible, 
horrible, time. It meant that the kids couldn’t have friends coming 
over…we stopped having people over for dinner, so that did go on for a 
long time. (DB). 
DB is not Eastern European and lives in a more affluent street, her anxiety was 
based in her belief that she had become contaminated and therefore a threat to others. She 
did not have the associated anxiety of MA’s gender and ethnicity concerns instead she 
reported a failure; ‘how is this happening to us?’  She adopted an approach of self-
immunisation as she withdrew from contact with others to avoid contagion. This is a 
shutting down of the munus, a withdrawal from social contact with dual motivations of 
shame coupled with the moral responsibility to avoid contagion.  
Entomological literature on the social impacts of bedbugs highlights comparable 
emotional distress and poor mental health which exacerbates existing conditions of social 
and material isolation (Goddard and de Shazo, 2012).   In contrast AC who had 
previously lived in South America with many different insects did not express abjection: 
‘I use to stay in Santiago in Chile; it was kinda like this area. I’m not 
bothered by creepy crawlies …. to me they (bedbugs) are like annoying 
but harmless, you are not going to die from them… they are not like a 
poisonous spider, they are a nuisance.’ (AC) 
Unlike MA and DB, AC interpreted first order affects using a different register. Her 
previous experience of dangerous insects appeared to generate a more flexible boundary. 
Her sense-making was based on a communal world view which included insects; a multi-
species munus. She did not view the bedbugs as a threat to her identity and therefore did 
not seek immunity. She was however pressured by family to rid her house of the bugs as 
both her and her partner’s parents’ response was one of horror and shame.  
This analysis shows how perspectives of humanised life (bios) can transform 
benign relations into horrific encounters. The threat of boundary breach influenced 
emotions and identity more powerfully than the material presence of a rash. For MA 
encountering the bedbugs enhanced aspects of her identity as woman and ethnic minority 
which translated into stereotype. The presence of the bedbugs appeared to dissolve DB’s 
sense of identity as she struggled with a change she felt she could not control. While AC 
experienced a sense of loss through the bedbug residence in her home she did not 
perceive the bugs’ presence as a boundary threat. The bedbug entry into these local 
communal environments of the home led to second order affects which were much more 
dependent on social and cultural norms than on their direct material effects on human 
bodies. This is an affective meshwork (Morton, 2010) where different affects come into a 
productive correspondence through which subjects are both generated and dissolved.   
Esposito’s articulation of com-munus as a division/sharing between or in-
common (2009) aligns with this meshwork of forces or affects in correspondence. Within 
this weave there are attractions and repulsions which operate both on the micro level of 
skin and saliva particles, and with the virtual force of norms which flow through human 
sense making. The collisions and collusions of these entities is the flux of the munus as 
wound. Exposure to which is the force of abjection as those who expressed such horror 
were confronted by the insecurity of the boundaries which they believed secure. The 
immunising response by those horrified was to shore up their borders by eliminating the 
threat. In contrast AC’s account suggests that she was more comfortable with fuzzier 
boundaries. The biosecurity benefits of ‘borderlands’ rather than ‘borderlines’ is noted by 
Hinchliffe et al (2013) in their study of avian flu. They argue that rather than drawing 
clear protective lines which keep out perceived bacterial invaders that it is more effective 
to develop ‘immuncompetence’. This is the ‘ability to live with a variety of other 
organisms that are always in circulation’ (537). AC did not view the bedbugs as a 
devastating security breach therefore did not resort to a violent immunitary response. As 
will be discussed below this immunising act toward bedbugs has unintended affects that 
ricochet far beyond human/bug relations in Govanhill.  
The violence widely adopted to destroy the bedbug threat mostly comes in the 
form of chemicals. Chemicals were first employed for human use with the advent of 
modern bio-technology. That is, as a facet of human mastery based in technological and 
biological progress. The stream of insecticides developed from the early 1900’s, 
organophosphates, pyrethroids, nicotinoids and now bendiocarbs have altered human/bug 
relations over the last century. They are used in agriculture to ensure that creatures cannot 
feed on crops intended for human use. The term ‘insecticide’ – insect killer – speaks 
directly to the negative biopolitical technique; the killing of one form of life for the 
protection of another.  These killer chemicals are used to delineate the border of the 
munus and guard against intrusion, however their extended affects indicate how 
immunisation flips into what Esposito terms ‘auto-immunisation’ and the tendency 
toward suicide.  This draws attention to the impossibility of the desired homeostatic 
immunity or idea of a munus which can flourish within sealed borders. The history of 
insecticides evidences how the immunitary act of extermination which intends to seal the 
wound opens another.  
Participants who had tried in vain to rid their houses of bedbugs with shop bought 
chemicals welcomed the local government, environmental health officers more thorough 
approach. However every contributor reported that as soon as they returned to their house 
they started to worry about the impact of the insecticides on themselves and their 
children: 
‘They come in with all of their white gear they spray everything so we had 
to get out of the house– they just came in and sprayed it all so when I 
came back there was all of this white residue all over everything the 
furniture everything…. I don’t know whether or not it’s poisonous’. (AC)  
The sight of the men in masks and white suits indicated that these chemicals came with 
risks. DB was concerned that repeated exposure to chemicals had played a part in she and 
her husband’s health issues, both of which developed subsequent to multiple chemical 
treatments, she said: 
We had rounds and rounds of spraying. My husband who has not had 
asthma since childhood now uses an inhaler and it is maybe a bit of a jump 
but I was recently diagnosed with a nerve wasting disease. It’s a very slow 
progress but it has been quite rapid and at the back of my mind I cannot 
help but think that the chemicals have had an adverse effect (DB). 
Despite the fact that the bugs returned, DB decided that the use of chemicals risked 
causing more harm and therefore declined any further spraying, defying the logic that 
these creatures should be killed without question. Other thanatapolitical tendencies of 
insecticide extend into multispecies streets and worlds.  
Despite their disappearance from life in the west since the mid 1900’s bedbugs 
have been around for at least 3000 years (Benoit et al 2016). However unlike the many 
species which have vanished in what has been called the “Sixth Extinction” (Kolbert, 
2014) bedbugs have been returning with renewed vigour not just in Govanhill but across 
continents. The chemical trail of human/bedbug life is one of resistance; first to 
chlorinated hydrocarbons, then organophosphates, and then pyrethroids (Gordon et al, 
2015). Bedbug adaptability has outflanked each new generation of toxin and has resulted 
in the current bedbug resurgence. Their presence grew 4500% in Australia between 2000 
and 2006 (Doggett et al, 2012). In Toronto there were 46 reported instances in 2003 
(none prior) to 1500 between March and October 2008; New York had 537 reports in 
2003 and 10,985 in 2009 (McDonald & Zavys, 2009). Most entomologists describe this 
as a global epidemic without hint of hyperbole. Bai et al (2011) claim that it is the human 
activity of insecticide use which has precipitated the evolution of bedbugs into an even 
more resistant life form. Human attempts to destroy these bugs have in fact facilitated the 
evolution of super resistant bugs. The attempt to close the wound, through the killing of 
these bugs for the preservation of human comfort, has had the reverse effect. 
The chemical facilitation of super bedbugs is just one affective strand of the 
biopolitics of insecticide extermination. There is no doubt that our extensive use of toxins 
has generated further breaches. The early organophosphates and DDT that not only 
brought relief from bedbugs but changed agriculture were recognised as harmful 70 years 
ago. Carson’s (2000[1962]) seminal ‘Silent Spring’ brought the legacy of harms from the 
use of toxins into full view. However 56 years after its publication and the demise of 
hundreds of thousands of species the battle to restrict their use continues.  Ficam W the 
current bedbug poison of choice, by Glasgow City Council’s environmental health 
services is a bendiocarb. Bendiocarbs have been voluntarily withdrawn from production 
in the USA since 2001 (Zepeda et al, 2017). The substance is graded of mild to moderate 
toxicity. It is harmful to creatures such as birds and is particularly toxic to honey bees and 
other pollinators.  The extinction of pollinators is of grave concern for the future of food 
production (Gill et al, 2012; Cressey, 2017). Furthermore, the industrial waste from 
organophosphates and pyrethroids is linked to ocean pollution (van Dooren, 2014). The 
wide spread toxic pollution caused by chemical production and use is a significant factor 
in the decrease in biodiversity which is underway throughout the planet (van Dooren et 
al, 2016). Notwithstanding the questionable ethics of destroying other life forms, this 
decrease in biodiversity and increased toxicity is having impacts on soil, access to water 
and food supplies.  
The demise of pollinators and ocean acidification which have resulted from 
human activity which aims to improve human life now threaten human survival in 
specific geographies (van Dooren, 2016).  This is a worrying consequence of human 
attempts to draw borderlines and control the munus. In depicting the munus as ‘wound’ 
Esposito (2013b) acknowledges the movement of life as a painful disruption as well as a 
point of encounter with difference and potential for innovation. The boundaries where 
difference meets are unstable, unpredictable, destructive and almost always 
uncomfortable and yet essential to the movement of life as it unfolds. Campbell 
(2006:16) states that central to Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics is the belief that if one 
life is harmed all are, as the ‘opening to an affirmative biopolitics takes place precisely 
when we recognize that harming one part of life or one life harms all lives’. This aligns 
with environmentalist, Aldo Leopald’s (1949) warning of the dangers of assigning worth 
to plants and animals based on their human utility. He states that the health of the ‘biotic 
community’ depends on all its members even those which are deemed destructive by 
humans. His thinking adds to an evaluative schema on thantapolitical decisions between 
life that is worth living and life that is not.  
The ethical questions which flow from recognition that the motion of prospering 
life inevitably includes destruction has been discussed by scholars negotiating the 
interplay of more than human encounters.  Ginn et al (2014) describe this as ‘awkward 
flourishing’. This concept does more than recognize that there is always destruction as it 
problematizes the binary relationship between human/animal victims and human/animal 
perpetrators. They state, ‘rather, flourishing involves many species knotted together, 
often imbricated in human landscapes or economy, working with and against other 
multispecies assemblies’ (115). In another article Green and Ginn (2014) set out the 
need for an ethics of ‘shared vulnerability’. This recognizes the biotic relations 
which traverse species being, and acknowledges the immanent relatedness of 
prospering life and destruction. This ‘shared vulnerability’ might be imagined as 
living within the ‘wound’ as a site where contamination becomes possibility.   
Participants’ narratives strongly indicate a move toward a more nuanced 
relationship with their bedbug residents. Notwithstanding the depth of initial abjection, to 
varying degrees participants’ views on life with the bugs changed with the knowledge 
they gained through living with them. Each recounted a growing awareness of the 
impacts of extermination methods. DB, who fled her house during her first encounter 
with the bugs, grew exhausted with relentless boiling and steaming, and worried about 
the more serious harms associated the repeated exposure to chemicals.  Destroying the 
bugs led to harm on participants and their families which in balance was not worthwhile.  
DB offered this analysis of her changing attitude: 
I think the thing is and I will be honest that it seemed like we were getting 
them regardless, you know I was being super clean and everything was 
immaculate and everything was steamed within an inch of its life and it 
got the point, not that I became slovenly but, I let things slide because it 
was a case of every time the guy came you had to take all the books off 
the book shelves, they had to be boxed, up all our clothes had to be boil-
washed, so this happened so many times that we ended up not taking them 
out. But at some point, I must have disconnected with it, I am just not 
engaging with it. You know it’s a collective thing, people upstairs have 
got it we are probably passing it back and forth (DB). 
As she assessed the different forms of discomfort, her boundaries changed. Letting 
‘things slide’ could be viewed as a slackening of her initial tight security, moving from 
rigid border to borderlands. Similarly MA’s changing language indicates a changed 
attitude as her discourse afforded them personalities and expression: 
‘….if you have mattresses with grooves where they can sit. Wherever they 
have a nice nook to hide they will be there’ (MA). 
This anthropomorphising of the bugs is a radically different response than the zero-
tolerance extermination reaction of first encounter where she depicted the creatures as 
‘aliens’. Ginn’s (2013) study on human/slug relations shows how his respondents’ 
detachment from these creatures allowed them to destroy them; in this Govanhill 
situation participants have had to pass through detachment as it became evident that 
destruction was not a viable option. This involved, although indavertant, recognition of 
shared vulnerability. For these participants developing relations with the bugs disrupted 
the negative biopolitical norms and provoked a different problematisation.  Their 
responses challenge the thanatapolitical drive and its auto-immunitary tendencies and as 
such are acts of resistance. This was not the active resistance they expressed initially, of 
digging in and defending their home through the destruction of bedbug intruders, and the 
instatement of the hard border of the home. This was a passive resistance, a resistance to 
the social norms which required their homes to be bedbug free. This involved an opening 
toward acceptance that their home was a shared space, a multispecies environment, which 
required management more than violence.  
This tolerance of discomfort precipitates further ethical questions. Some might 
ask why should they tolerate bedbugs just because they do not have the financial 
resources to leave the area? In other words, they are situationally forced to live with 
bedbugs because they are living in impoverished, dirty, and conditions. Structural 
inequality and systematic discrimination create these ‘sub-human’ conditions that violate 
the basic rights of the privileged human (bíos) to secure a clean, sanitized and thus 
bedbug free place to live. Environmental science makes a convincing case for unequal 
distribution of detrimental impact associated with anthropogenic harm to the ecology of 
the planet. Those living in economically disadvantaged geographies are more likely to 
experience the detrimental unintended consequences of negative biopolitics as it 
manifests in climate change, pollution and chemical resistance. While weather events 
such as Hurricane Katrina, do not discriminate, the recovery of the less wealthy is much 
slower than the affluent (Moore, 2015). Arguably the situation described in this paper in 
Govanhill is yet another example of such structural inequality as more affluent people 
who find bedbugs in their property have the option to move. However to frame a solution 
to the problem in this way would be to miss the bigger issues at stake and to miss the 
opportunity to learn from this disruption of thanatopolitics. Esposito (2013a, 2012) 
argues that the thantapolitical drive cannot be simply reversed. However it can be 
challenged through a process of disruption. He states the ‘problem (of thanatapolitics) has 
to be tackled on two levels: by disabling the apparatuses of negative immunization, and 
by enabling new spaces of the common’ (Esposito, 2013a: 88). This expresses the need to 
disrupt the logic and practices that promote auto-immunity in order that new relations 
might form. Such disruption, described by Bird and Short (2017) is an action which can 
be both ‘liberating’ and ‘isolating’. It also generates a raft of ethical questions. 
 
The multi-species munus 
Environmental justice campaigners and scholars (Sklair, 2017) propose that 
humans, particularly those in wealthy countries should live differently as the lifestyles of 
the wealthy which include increased travel, high levels of consumption of material goods 
and high levels of meat consumption are having detrimental impacts on the ecology 
which sustains human life. The extent of our impact on the geology of the planet has led 
to calls for a new geological epoch, the ‘anthropocene’ (Crutzen and Stormer, 2000). The 
various warnings issued relate to soil erosion, ocean pollution, global warming and 
extreme weather events. These all call for humans to consider the implications of current 
lifestyle norms in order that they are changed. The adjustment made by participants 
toward the borderlands of ‘shared vulnerability’ was certainly informed by such reason. 
As bedbugs are not known vectors of disease and as the poisons used to kill them are 
harmful often in ways which are not known until after years of use, common sense 
predicates that keeping the bedbugs at bay rather than complete extermination is the 
sensible option. However, there is another more profound ethical issue which relates to 
the problems which affirmative biopolitics exposes. If all life matters and the protection 
of the subject is impossible; where the subject exists only as a metastable entity; if 
intervention which aims to heal inadvertently ruptures in new unthought-of ways, then 
how is it possible to act?    
Carey Wolfe (2013), a scholar of post humanism, highlights the problem of the 
‘principle of unlimited equivalence’ (Wolfe, 2013:56) that he reads in Esposito. Where 
all life is valued equally there is no way of differentiating, between ‘condor and child’ as 
‘ethics is a non-contingent view from nowhere’. On what basis is action possible if at one 
end of the immunitary pole there is a risk of protection which flips into a stifling 
thanatopolitics and at the other end there is no principle which supports action. 
Understanding the participants’ experience through Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics has 
something to offer this debate. This does not come in the form of a more than human 
deontology but in an ‘ethics of encounter’ (Edmunds, 2011). Such an ethics focuses not 
on moral abstraction but on the material and virtual affects which operate in discrete 
contexts. This provides not a view from ‘nowhere’ but a unique view within the context 
of the specific situation, or munus, where life is affectively unfolding.  
Edmund’s critique of James (1977) thesis on the blindness of humans leads him to 
conclude that, feelings are the route through which shared experience is possible. To use 
his example, we might not share the dog’s idea of a bone but we can share in its 
enthusiasm. An ethics of encounter therefore surpasses James’s call for tolerance based in 
acknowledgement of human blindness, as this positions us as spectators, instead an ethics 
of encounter is participation with the other, an act which blurs the boundaries between 
subjects and results in their undoing. This boundary work resembles the disruptive action 
of Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics. It is a distribution which does not belong to the 
subject. It is a becoming with/cum. This is an active process not a passive acceptance as 
that position belongs to James’ spectator. This ethics of encounter is evident in the 
narratives in a number of ways.  
First, as discussed above, participants’ experience was driven by exposure as the 
limits of their spatial and sensory boundaries were breached. Their narratives describe 
boundary work, as they wrestle to contain and navigate what they described as an 
invasion. Second feelings were the operative register which drew them in as participants. 
The encounter was first experienced through horror. This intensity of exposure generated 
an awareness of limits and while it initially precipitated a desire for immunity it 
simultaneously located participants within the boundary between secure and recognisable 
limits and intimacy with insects. They could not refuse so occupied this exposure beyond 
the limits of their corporeal and spatial boundaries. Edmunds (2011) discusses the ‘being 
with’ as participation in feeling with the other. This was evident in terms which MA used 
to describe them; ‘huddled together’, ‘sitting’, ‘waiting’, ‘full’.  Her use of such terms 
may anthropomorphise the bugs but in doing so implies her attempt to feel with them. 
She cannot know what sense, if any, the bugs make of these experiences but she occupies 
the possibility of feeling alongside them.  
This encounter acted to regenerate ‘connections between judgements and 
feelings’ (Edmunds, 2011:140), which resulted in not simply a shift in perspective but an 
undoing which carried forward into new ways of being. Drawing on Simondon and 
Deleuze, Esposito states, ‘humans are not a being as such but a becoming that carries 
together within itself the traces of a different past and the prefiguration of a new future’ 
(Esposito, 2008:88). Becoming in the Deleuzoguattarian sense is not a teleological 
movement toward an extended present but places much more emphasis on the undoing of 
the present and a future yet to be known. In this respect DB’s relief was not so much an 
epiphany about her place in the world but a release which came from entering a flow 
which she could not control. She acknowledged that her own perceived limits had been 
exceeded and this had not led to the destruction which her earlier sense of horror 
intimated. She is in correspondence with something more than her sense of self. She is 
not the author as the other has an unpredictable part to play.  
Although a detached view might describe these experiences as simple tolerance, 
attention to the narratives suggests otherwise. The fear of auto-immunisation as 
documented in these cases where: killing the bugs = killing (harming) myself 
inadvertently led these people to arrive at a position of ‘shared vulnerability’. The passive 
resistance of relaxing the tight borderlines referred to earlier, involved active navigation 
of a dynamic affective situation. These encounters marked a move toward greater 
experimentation. Some noted that participating in the interview was an aspect of this 
process. They described talking to neighbours whom they might have avoided previously 
and further questioning the logic of extermination by chemicals as the only feasible 
option. In these three situations participants sought more information on bedbug life to 
inform themselves on how to maintain this precarious situation without giving up or 
becoming consumed by the need to destroy all of the bugs. This recognition of ‘shared 
vulnerability’ was certainly not a place of comfort but it was a place of possibility as they 
became open to new ideas which challenged their norms.  They adopted a process of 
protection that required participation and adaptation not the absolute of extermination. 
This required stepping out of the centre and recognising that control over other forms of 
life is costly, undesirable and counterproductive. While none would have described 
bedbugs as a ‘gift’ in Esposito’s terminology, they came to realise that they could not be 
refused. Bedbug life became woven into their life influencing their behaviour and 
choices. Their homes were multi-species environments not human fortresses.  
Participants’ direct experience and growing knowledge of the wider impacts 
changed the stakes. Their focus was no longer on optimum comfort but on the longer-
term health of themselves and their children. In this shift, the presence of bedbugs was no 
longer a problem of how to exterminate them but how to live with them. Their narratives 
depict an affective community, a com-munus not based on identity or ownership but on 
the shared experience of forces which different colliding bodies exert on each other in the 
movement of becoming life. Affirmative biopolitics hosts both the destruction within the 
movement of life and the possibility of the yet to become. 
In the time of anthropocene the calls for humans to develop different types of 
relations with other life forms and environments are increasingly audible. These 
narratives show how it is possible for people to live within the wound, acknowledging 
not denying their exposure, and making decisions based in a situated ethics of encounter. 
However they also show how difficult this is. Esposito describes the polarity of the 
immunitary paradigm, while these narratives show the possibility of shifting position they 
also imply that such an altered view occurred in the absence of choice. This is a chilling 
prospect for human life in multiple arenas where immunitary practices continue to have 
deleterious effects.  This situation also presents an opportunity to think differently about 
what is valued and how public discourse might benefit from a shift toward greater 
deliberation. Instead of immediate condemnation of bedbugs a public discourse which 
contemplated the implications of chemical destruction more effectively might more 
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i Simondon has only one essay published in English which is Gilbert Simondon (1992), “The Genesis of the Individual,” in 
Incorporations, Zone 6. There are a growing number of works which develop his thinking, Pascal Chabot (2006), The Philosophy of 
Simondon; David Scott (2014), Gilbert Simondon’s Psychic and Collective Individuation. 
 
